2nd Semester 2024/25: Anti-exceptionalism about Logic

Instructors

Sabina Dominguez Parrado

ECTS

6

Description

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the view that logic is continuous with science. It is perhaps the most popular view in the philosophy of logic today, with authors such as Graham Priest and Timothy Williamson appealing to anti-exceptionalist arguments to support their preferred logical theory. However, despite its popularity, the core claims of anti-exceptionalism remain in need of further clarification. The project aims at providing an overview of this debate, covering topics such as:

• Formulations of Anti-exceptionalism. We will examine different ways to articulate anti-exceptionalism about logic. In particular, we will compare Quine’s naturalism with more recent formulations of anti-exceptionalism.
• Epistemological Anti-exceptionalism. Epistemological anti-exceptionalism holds that logical theories are not be justified by a priori evidence, but rather in the same way as scientific ones. We will discuss a central question for this view: what counts as evidence for a logical theory?
• Methodological Anti-exceptionalism. According to methodological anti-exceptionalism, logic is methodologically akin to the science. This claim raises a key question: what is the methodology of logic? Or, perhaps more importantly: what should the methodology of logic be? We will consider a range of candidate answers, including logical abductivism, reflective equilibrium and logical predictivism.
• Challenges to Logical Anti-exceptionalism. We will examine a number of challenges to anti-exceptionalism, such as the background logic problem and the adoption problem.

Organisation

There will be introductory lectures on each of the selected topics. The remaining sessions will  consist of seminars led by students. Each student will have to present a research paper and prepare questions for discussion. In week 3, students will have an individual meeting to discuss their research proposal for a (hypothetical) master thesis.

Prerequisites

No previous familiarity with the philosophy of logic is expected, only some interest in the topic.

Assessment

The project will be assessed on the basis of (1) participation, (2) a presentation and (3) a research proposal.

References

A complete selection of research papers will be made available during the first meeting. However, this should give you a good enough idea of what you can expect from the project.

• Finn, S. (2019). The Adoption Problem and Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic. Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):231.
• Hlobil, U. (2020). Limits of Abductivism About Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
• Hjortland, O., T. (2017). Anti-exceptionalism about logic. Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
• Martin, B., & Hjortland, O. T. (2023). Evidence in Logic. In Lasonen-Aarnio M., & Littlejohn, C., The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
• Russell, G. (2015). The Justification of the Basic Laws of Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):793-803.
• Williamson, T. (2017). Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology. In Bradley P. Armour-Garb, Reflections on the Liar. Oxford, England: Oxford University. pp. 325-346.
• Wyatt, N., & Payette, G. (2018). How Do Logics Explain? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):157-167.