1st Semester 2022/23: Deflationism about truth

Instructors

dr. Thomas Schindler

ECTS

6

Description

Deflationists about truth claim that the concept of truth is not a deep and mysterious concept. Instead, it only exists in our language in order to fulfil a certain logical or linguistic function. This position is in strong contrast to the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth that try to define truth in terms of correspondence with reality and coherence with other beliefs, respectively. We will approach this topic by working through some contemporary research papers by advocates and critics of deflationism, starting with some chapters from Paul Horwich’s classic monograph “Truth” (OUP, 1998, second edition).

Prerequisites

None

Assessment

Students taking the course for credit will be expected to

(1) give a presentation summarising one of the research papers that we will read during the project; and

(2) write a short essay, critically engaging with the course material.

References

Horwich, Paul. 1998. Truth. Second Edition. Oxford University Press.