Perceiving What Could Be. A Critique of Perception-Based Epistemologies of Possibility
Alex Silviu Stan

Abstract:
This thesis is a critique of the claim that perception can lead us to knowledge of possibilities and an attempt to offer an alternative view, based on the knowledge of our own abilities. First, I discuss and analyze available, perception-based epistemologies of possibility and I argue that all of them fail. I identtify three types of issues with those accounts: they face the problem of modal epistemic friction and collapse into ability-based epistemologies of possibility, they run into circularity problems, or their proposed version of modal knowledge falls short of full-blown, actual world knowledge of possibility. Second, I propose a new ability-based epistemology of possibility, grounded in bodily awareness, that manages to avoid the problems that arise in the case of perception-based accounts and of the other available ability-based modal epistemology, namely the one proposed by Barbara Vetter. In particular, in contrast to Vetter’s theory, the account that I propose can explain the phenomenon of intrapersonal imitation, which I argue is crucial in the process of ability knowledge acquisition.