Arbitrary Terms with No Arbitrary Object
Stefano Zuffi

Abstract:
This thesis investigates the topic of arbitrary reasoning: for example a reasoning starting with a stipulation such as “let n be any natural number”. We shall consider which construal of arbitrary terms, such as indeed ‘n’, is the most appropriate, in particular how much one can argue for a referential picture of the meaning of such terms. We will start with an Introduction (Chapter 0), where an informal introduction to the topic is given and where it is argued against a view which regards such terms as purely meaningless. Then we shall delve into the two most mainstream types of referential accounts, respectively in Chapter 1 and 2, concluding how they all seem unsatisfactory. Finally, in Chapter 3, an original proposal is suggested, which is referred to as the quasi-referential account: first by introducing it informally and philosophically, then by providing a possible formalization for it.