Cornelius Van Til’s Presuppositional Epistemology as a New Model for Deep Disagreement: Relations to and Improvements on Quasi-Fideism
Simeon du Toit

Abstract:
A new model for deep disagreement is derived from Presuppositional Epistemology. This is done by a critical appraisal of an attempt to unify Duncan Pritchard’s Quasi-Fideism with the Presuppositional Apologetic by Nicholas Smith. Quasi-Fideism is a version of Wittgenstein’s Hinge Epistemology. The result is a novel model for deep disagreement that satisfies all the criteria identified by an influential account of deep disagreement by Chris Ranalli. The resulting theory of deep disagreement includes a model for rational reasoning that distinguishes between world-view internal and world-view external reasoning, solving multiple puzzles surrounding how beliefs are rationally justified.