On the stability of flexible permission structures
Leanne M. Streekstra

Abstract:
Games with a permission structure are a type of cooperative games with transferable utility in which cooperation is restricted. In these games it is assumed that players can have veto power over other players. Two approaches are distinguished. In the conjunctive approach, a player needs permission from all his direct superiors to be able to cooperate. In the disjunctive approach, a players needs permission from only one of his direct superiors. In this thesis we study the stability properties of these permission networks.
In order to do so, we first create a new model that allows for superior-successor links to be created and severed and in which links have a cost to them. For the conjunctive approach we find that only trees and forests can be stable, as an agent can only receive less value when the amount of his direct superiors increases. In the disjunctive approach, having more direct superiors can increase the value allocated to a player. Whether trees can be stable or not depends in this case on the size of the link cost.